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In June of 2014, the “Islamic State” (ISIL)1, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, seized 
control of Mosul, a city in northern Iraq close to the border of both Syria and Turkey.2 
Shortly after the seizure of Mosul, the group declared a worldwide caliphate and 
demanded allegiance from other Islamist groups.3 Since this declaration, ISIL’s 
territorial control has rapidly spread across northern Iraq and Syria.4 In addition to 
expanding its geographical presence, ISIL has also taken responsibility for a number 
of terrorist attacks throughout the world—perhaps most notably, the November 2015 
Paris attacks.5 
In response to the emergence of ISIL, the United States began using military force 
in an attempt to stop the group’s growth. The United States has mostly used strategic 
airstrikes to attack ISIL, but there has also been some use of special operations 
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 1. The Islamic State is referred to by a number of different names, the most common 
being the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and Daesh 
(داعش). Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One Group, Many Names, BBC (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277 [https://perma.cc/M8SJ-YL8J]. For 
the purpose of this Note I will refer to the group as ISIL.  
 2. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, GUARDIAN (June 
10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-
militants-seize-control-mosul [https://perma.cc/8YE9-EPDC]. 
 3. Matt Bradley, ISIS Declares New Islamic Caliphate, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate-1404065263 
[https://perma.cc/2D5H-KZJG]; David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-
isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/ [https://perma.cc/5MR2-W95Y]. 
 4. Ben Piven, Who, What and Where Is ISIL? Explaining the Islamic State, ALJAZEERA 
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/18/isil-threat-explained.html 
[https://perma.cc/XL6F-TZAL].  
 5. Steve Almasy, Pierre Meilhan & Jim Bittermann, Paris Massacre: At Least 128 Killed 
in Gunfire and Blasts, French Officials Say, CNN (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com 
/2015/11/13/world/paris-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/22NC-3H8B].  
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troops. Additionally, in some instances, the United States has supplied equipment 
and training to local troops who oppose ISIL.6 Despite the United States’ continued 
use of force against ISIL, Congress has not granted authorization specifically 
permitting the executive branch to use military force in response to ISIL’s 
emergence.  
In recent military campaigns Congress has typically passed legislation that 
authorizes the executive’s use of military force. For example, Congress passed an 
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) following the September 11th 
attacks in 2001. During his presidency, President Obama requested that Congress 
pass a new AUMF specifically granting the use of force against ISIL, but Congress 
failed to enact any specified authorization.7 President Trump has not renewed 
Obama’s attempt to receive new authorization from Congress, but members of his 
cabinet have expressed their support for new legislation.8 
Congress refused to pass Obama’s proposed resolution due to differences in 
beliefs regarding the extent of authorization that should be granted.9 It is unlikely 
that any compromise will be made due to the heavy division of opinion among 
lawmakers, as even members of the same party have differing opinions about the 
proper parameters for using force against ISIL.10 Despite the general disagreement 
regarding the extent of power that should be allocated to the executive, the majority 
of Congress does support the use of force against ISIL.11 
 In the absence of such an authorization, the Obama administration relied on the 
AUMF that was passed in 2001 as a response to the September 11th terror attacks 
(9/11 AUMF).12 This provision states: 
 [T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Ashley Fantz, War on ISIS: Who’s Doing What?, CNN (Nov. 27, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/20/world/war-on-isis-whos-doing-what/ 
[https://perma.cc/HL6N-V8ZH]; Eric Messinger, Congress Appropriates Funds for President 
to Train Syrian Opposition, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
15221/congress-appropriates-funds-president-train-syrian-opposition/ 
[https://perma.cc/47FQ-M74L]. 
 7. Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond, Obama ISIS Fight Request Sent to Congress, CNN 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/politics/isis-aumf-white-house-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/6DV4-AAYA]. 
 8. Jeremy Herb, Mattis, Tillerson Talk Authorizing ISIS War, CNN (Aug. 2, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/mattis-tillerson-isis-war/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/EU25-SN6V]. 
 9. Acosta & Diamond, supra note 7. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; Herb, supra note 8.  
 12. Marty Lederman, The Legal Theory Behind the President’s New Military Initiative 
Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/14799/legal-
theory-presidents-military-initiative-isil/ [https://perma.cc/D9PP-37QK]. 
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to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.13 
The Obama administration asserted that the 9/11 AUMF has always allowed the 
President to “address the threat from ISIL” and that President Obama only requested 
a new AUMF because he “believe[s] we are strongest as a nation when the President 
and Congress work together.”14 The Obama administration asserted that ISIL falls 
within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF under the legal theory that:  
[b]ased on ISIL’s longstanding relationship with [al-Qaeda] . . . and 
continued desire to conduct [sic] attacks against U.S. persons and 
interests . . . and ISIL’s position—supported by some individual 
members and factions of [al-Qaeda]-aligned groups—that it is the true 
inheritor of Usama bin Laden’s legacy, the President may rely on the 
2001 AUMF as statutory authority for the use of force against ISIL, 
notwithstanding the recent public split between [al-Qaeda’s] senior 
leadership and ISIL.15 
This theory essentially asserts that because ISIL was closely affiliated with al-
Qaeda and because ISIL has replaced al-Qaeda as the U.S.’s primary threat in the 
Middle East, ISIL is effectively the same as al-Qaeda and should be included under 
the AUMF. The Trump administration has continued to rely on this precedent 
established by President Obama, as his cabinet members have expressed that the 9/11 
AUMF is sufficient to continue the United States’ military campaigns.16  
Despite this rationalization, a number of law professors and legal scholars have 
taken the position that the executive branch’s attempt to justify its actions against 
ISIL by relying on the 9/11 AUMF is improper.17 The general consensus among 
those taking this position is that the executive must seek additional authority to fight 
ISIL through either a new AUMF or another form of congressional approval.18 While 
this may be the “legally safer” route to take, it ignores the strong likelihood that 
President Trump will be left without this type of authorization due to the divided 
state of Congress.19 This creates an obvious issue because the interests of the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541). 
 14. Lederman, supra note 12.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Andrew Rudalevige, Here’s Why the Trump Administration May Actually Want 
Congress to Pass a New Authorization for Military Force, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/20/heres-why-the-trump-
administration-may-actually-want-congress-to-pass-a-new-authorization-for-military-
force/?utm_term=.05f1ab186a5f [https://perma.cc/23G7-NHLU]. 
 17. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE  
(May 5, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional  
[https://perma.cc/PTX5-4YU9].  
 18. See, e.g., William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512 (2015). 
 19. Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. 
REV. 971, 974 (2016) (“[W]e are living through a uniquely toxic U.S. domestic political 
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States—and the rest of the world—are best served by eradicating the threat ISIL 
poses to worldwide security and stability.  
ISIL is perhaps the most dangerous terror organization in the world.20 Although 
the exact number of members is not known, it is estimated that the organization has 
around 20,000 members.21 At the beginning of 2016, ISIL was responsible for at least 
18,800 deaths in Iraq alone.22 Another dangerous aspect of the organization is its 
ability to inspire others to commit acts of terror. Outside of Iraq and Syria, 1200 
people have died in attacks either inspired or organized by ISIL.23 For example, the 
Orlando nightclub shooting that took place in July 2016 is considered an act of terror 
that was inspired by ISIL.24  
Recently President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin both declared 
that ISIL has been defeated in Syria25 and Iraq Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi 
announced that the Iraqi Military successfully liberated Iraq from ISIL.26 Despite the 
                                                                                                                 
 
environment, where interbranch cooperation has been almost entirely stalemated.”). In the 
past, Congress was unable to pass such legislation leaving President Obama in the gray for 
years despite the obvious threat posed by ISIL.  
 20. Andrew Flowers, Global Terrorism Declined Last Year—But Not in the West, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 30, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/global-terrorism-
declined-last-year-but-not-in-the-west/ [https://perma.cc/WM49-WX8W] (being responsible 
for over 8000 confirmable deaths, ISIL was the deadliest terror group in 2015); see also 
Annalise Lekas, Comment, #ISIS: The Largest Threat to World Peace Trending Now, 30 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 313, 314 (2015). 
 21. Harriet Agerholm, ISIS ‘Decimated’ in Iraq and Syria and Could Have Only 15,000 
Fighters Left, US Commander Says, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 11, 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-syria-iraq-fighters-number-us-
military-campaign-impact-how-many-soldiers-a7184886.html  
[https://perma.cc/2GVZ-SU55]. 
 22. Alastair Jamieson, ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, U.N. Says, NBC 
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-
killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 [https://perma.cc/2XJ4-JCK5]. Although incomparable to the 
loss of human life, it is notable that ISIL has been responsible for the destruction of many 
historical monuments and sites. Rachel Van Bokkem, History in Ruins: Cultural Heritage 
Destruction Around the World, AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/april-
2017/history-in-ruins-cultural-heritage-destruction-around-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/LNM2-9XQR]. 
 23. Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins, Tom Giratikanon & Jasmine C. Lee, How Many 
People Have Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-
world.html [https://perma.cc/9DEX-UXVS]. 
 24. Ralph Ellis, Ashley Fantz, Eliott C. McLaughlin & Tim Hume, Orlando Shooting: 
What Motivated a Killer?, CNN (June 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-
nightclub-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/BEE5-YTLX] (explaining that investigators found that 
the gunman was most likely “self-radicalized” through consumption of “jihadist propaganda” 
on the internet). 
 25. Hashem Osseiran, Has ISIS Really Been Defeated?, PAC. STANDARD (Dec 21, 2017), 
https://psmag.com/news/has-the-demise-of-isis-been-exaggerated [https://perma.cc/LUK9-
AGYA]. 
 26. Haider Al-Abadi (@HaiderAlAbadi), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
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success seen during 2017, it is too soon to declare victory while ISIL fighters remain 
active and the organization maintains control over territory in North Africa and the 
Middle East. 
Even President Trump admits that the fight against ISIL is not over, as the 
organization has “spread to other areas.”27 Considering the negative impacts of ISIL 
on the global community, it is apparent that the security and stability of the United 
States and its allies rely on our continued efforts to suppress and fully eliminate the 
organization and its influence. 
If an explicit congressional authorization—such as an Islamic State AUMF—is 
truly required to continue using force against ISIL, the United States faces an 
ultimatum of fighting an illegal war or remaining idle. This Note proposes an 
alternative by making the argument that Congress has already approved the 
executive’s use of force against ISIL.  
This Note argues that Congress has already expressly or implicitly authorized the 
use of force against ISIL through past legislation. I make this argument by applying 
the existing evidence of authorization of force to the framework laid by 
Youngstown.28 The argument is two-fold: that the hostilities are expressly authorized 
under the 9/11 AUMF and that the hostilities are implicitly authorized by 
congressional appropriations.  
In Part I of this note, I outline both the birth and rise of ISIL. I examine the 
background of the organization in order to illustrate why ISIL falls within the scope 
of the 9/11 AUMF. Part II of this Note then explains the manners in which Congress 
has already granted authorization to use force. In Part II.A, I outline how Congress 
has explicitly authorized the executive to use force against ISIL through the 9/11 
AUMF. In Part II.B, I explore how Congress has implicitly authorized the executive 
to use force against ISIL through appropriations. In Part III, I examine how the 
avenue used by the Obama administration could be used by President Trump as he 
continues the campaign against ISIL. 
I. THE BIRTH OF ISIL 
In order to understand why ISIL falls within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF, an 
examination of the history of ISIL is necessary. A common argument against ISIL 
being covered by the existing AUMF is that it was not Congress’s intent to authorize 
military action against groups that did not exist at the time the AUMF was passed. 
This argument assumes a major simplification in the organization’s history: that ISIL 
                                                                                                                 
 
https://twitter.com/HaiderAlAbadi/status/939525191637532672  
[https://perma.cc/NCV4-N982] (“We announce to the world the liberation of Iraq and the 
defeat of Daesh”); Eric Levenson & Jomana Karadsheh, Iraq is ‘Fully Liberated’ from ISIS, 
Its Military Says, CNN (Dec. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/09/middleeast/iraq-isis-
military-liberated/index.html [https://perma.cc/X5W4-3UVF]. 
 27. Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President Trump at 
Signing of H.R. 2810, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (Dec. 12, 2017) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-signing-h-r-2810-national-defense-authorization-act-fy2018/ [https://perma.cc/RKM5-
APCY]). 
 28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 
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did not exist until after the death of Usama bin-Laden, well after the influence of al-
Qaeda began to decline. An exploration into the group’s origin and its involvement 
in United States-Middle Eastern affairs illustrates how these arguments may be 
misguided. 
In 1991, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi29 founded Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad 
(JTWJ)—an Islamist group that would later become ISIL.30 Unlike al-Qaeda, which 
had the primary goal of defeating the West, JTWJ aimed to overthrow the monarchy 
established in Jordan and eventually take control of the Levant.31 Despite the 
differences in goals, Usama bin-Laden—the leader of al-Qaeda from its formation 
until his death in 2011—sent al-Zarqawi funding to establish training camps in the 
region. Bin-Laden would continue sending money for this purpose until the 
September 11th attacks.32 
After the September 11th attacks, al-Zarqawi’s group fought the United States in 
Afghanistan alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban.33 Following the initial U.S. 
airstrikes in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi recruited fighters and mobilized resources to 
prepare to oppose United States and coalition forces in Iraq.34 Al-Zarqawi became 
notorious among other terror leaders in Iraq, eventually becoming the most important 
contact for all terror organizations in the region.35  
In 2004, al-Zarqawi swore a pledge of loyalty—known as bay’ah36—to bin-Laden 
and changed JTWJ’s name to “al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers” or al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI), which brought the group into the greater al-Qaeda network.37 Despite 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Although less widely known than Usama bin-Laden, al-Zarqawi was a high-profile 
Islamist leader who, inter alia, was infamously known for killing Nicolas Berg in a video that 
resulted in horror across the world. ‘Zarqawi’ Beheaded US Man in Iraq, BBC (May 13, 
2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3712421.stm [https://perma.cc/2ATP-YEBS]. 
He was eventually killed by the United States during an airstrike in 2006. Mary Anne Weaver, 
The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2006), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-
al-zarqawi/304983/ [https://perma.cc/4LNW-5B8L]. 
 30. AARON Y. ZELIN, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POLICY, THE WAR BETWEEN ISIS AND AL-
QAEDA FOR SUPREMACY OF THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT 1 (2014), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7277-3THK].  
 31. Id. The Levant is the region comprised of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, 
and southern Turkey (sometimes including Cyprus). Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, What is the 
Levant?, DAWN (June 17, 2014), http://www.dawn.com/news/1113209 
[https://perma.cc/MLG6-ME6B]. 
 32. Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State (Oct. 23, 
2017), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1 
 [https://perma.cc/VZU6-CVA6]. 
 33. M. J. KIRDAR, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, AL QAEDA IN IRAQ 1 (2001), 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110614_ 
Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NN4-Z2GM]. 
 34. Id. at 3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. NORMAN CIGAR, AL-QAIDA, THE TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNMENT: LESSONS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ’S UNSTABLE TRIANGLE 18 (2015). 
 37. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2. 
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being aligned with al-Qaeda, AQI often acted in ways that frustrated al-Qaeda’s 
leadership.38 Regardless, Al-Zarqawi, by instruction of al-Qaeda leadership, began 
recruiting to expand the organization’s ranks. In early 2006, al-Zaraqawi brought 
several lesser known organizations into the al-Qaeda network.39 These terror groups, 
in addition to AQI, aligned into an umbrella organizational structure called “Majlis 
Shura al-Mujhadein” (MSM).40 Al-Zaraqawi served as the leader of MSM until his 
death in June 2006.41 Abu Hamza al-Muhajar was promoted to lead both AQI and 
MSM after Al-Zaraqawi’s death.42 
In October 2006, MSM made an announcement establishing itself as the Islamic 
State in Iraq (ISI) and appointing Abu Omar al-Baghdadi43 as its leader.44 Al-
Muhajar45 then pledged bay’ah to al-Baghdadi, fully merging AQI into ISI in the 
process.46 Even after al-Zarqawi’s death and the establishment of the Islamic State, 
the group remained a part of the al-Qaeda network, sharing resources and 
collaborating until 2014 when al-Qaeda severed its ties with what had become ISIL.47 
Much of ISIL’s uprising can be attributed to the unrest in Syria. In the early 2010s, 
a revolutionary movement known as the “Arab Spring” spread across the Middle 
East.48 In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Syria, sparking demonstrations by both 
Syrian youth and those experiencing economic hardship caused by Syrian President 
Assad’s policy changes.49 The Syrian government responded with violence in an 
attempt to quell the demonstrations.50 The opposite occurred and more Syrians began 
opposing Assad in light of the extreme measures he took against his citizenry.51 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. For example, Usama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri (the current leader of al-
Qaeda) often instructed al-Zarqawi to stop committing acts of violence aimed toward Sunni 
citizens, to which he refused compliance. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Ahmed S. Hashim, The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate, 21 
MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL 69 (2014). 
 43. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was the first leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and was 
succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi, the first and current leader of 
ISIL. See Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 
2010), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/ 
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/2VNC-NT93]. 
 44. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2. 
 45. Abu Hamza al-Muhajar also served as the leader of MSM from June 2006 until 
October 2006. The position then shifted to al-Baghdadi when the Islamic State in Iraq was 
declared. 
 46. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. For a background of the countries affected by the Arab Spring, see generally Arab 
Uprisings, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12813859 
[https://perma.cc/M3V6-QHLH]. 
 49. CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: POWER 
SHIFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?: SYRIA’S BLOODY ARAB SPRING 38–39  
(2012), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43464/ [https://perma.cc/UN2Y-EETB]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Eventually the citizens began rebelling against the Assad regime, resulting in the 
current civil war.52 The chaos resulting from the conflict allowed ISIL to take control 
of a significant portion of Syria, which further spread the group’s dominion and 
influence.53 
After building support in Syria, ISIL began laying claim to territory in Iraq and 
Syria. After claiming Mosul in June 2014, ISIL declared a worldwide caliphate and 
called for the support of other Islamist organizations.54 At the organization’s peak, it 
controlled about a third of both Syria and Iraq.55 In early 2017, the group’s control 
had been reduced to 52,700 square kilometers.56  
In an effort to halt the growth of ISIL, the United States formed an anti-ISIL 
coalition.57 Over sixty countries support the coalition, including the countries 
comprising the European Union and the Arab League.58 To date, significant progress 
has been made in the coalition’s campaign against ISIL. One year after ISIL declared 
the worldwide caliphate, the anti-ISIL coalition had led more than 5500 airstrikes 
against ISIL targets.59 At the end of 2016, U.S. officials announced that “US-led 
airstrikes have killed up to 75% of [ISIL] fighters and 180 of its leaders.”60 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. For a brief survey of the Syrian Civil War, see generally Kathy Gilsinan, The 
Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-
isis/410746/ [https://perma.cc/X4ZX-PNK8]. 
 53. Stephen Zunes, The U.S. and the Rise of ISIS, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/the-us-and-the-rise-of-is_b_8754584.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QDW-KWER]. 
 54. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  
 55. See Henry Johnsen, Mapped: The Islamic State Is Losing Its Territory—and Fast, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 16, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-
state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/ [https://perma.cc/CBV5-J8FH]. 
 56. SETH G. JONES, JAMES DOBBINS, DANIEL BYMAN, CHRISTOPHER S. CHIVVIS, BEN 
CONNABLE, JEFFREY MARTINI, ERIC ROBINSON & NATHAN CHANDLER, ROLLING BACK THE 
ISLAMIC STATE 9 (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FP7-EQMU]; see also, Rukmini Callimachi (@rcallimachi), TWITTER (Oct. 
17, 2017, 5:48 PM), https://twitter.com/rcallimachi/status/920451475624677377 
[https://perma.cc/QC9Z-G4S4] (reporting that ISIL holds only 10,210 square kilometers in 
Iraq and Syria). 
 57. Sebastian Payne, What the 60-Plus Members of the Anti-Islamic State Coalition Are 
Doing, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/25/what-the-60-members-
of-the-anti-islamic-state-coalition-are-doing/?utm_term=.46cd60eb3ebd 
[https://perma.cc/A6CR-MX5Y]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Jim Michaels, Islamic State Recruiting Offsets 15,000 Killed by Airstrikes in Past 
Year, USA TODAY (July 29, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/29/ 
air-campaign-kills-15000-isis-militants-pentagon-iraq-syria/30750327/ 
[https://perma.cc/R6RD-CAVK]. 
 60. Nicole Gaouette, Obama has Degraded ISIS. Can Trump Finish the Job?, CNN (Dec. 
14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/14/politics/isis-degraded- 
trump-policy/ [https://perma.cc/SR33-UHA8]. 
2018] Congressional Authorization of the Campaign Against ISIL 123 
 
the organization’s numbers are thinning, the Pentagon has reported that “a lot of work 
remains” before the conflict with ISIL is concluded.61 
II. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war.62 Despite this 
allocation of power, the Constitution instructs that the President shall be the 
Commander in Chief.63 These provisions attempt to balance the power between the 
two branches by giving the President control of the military, but, generally, requiring 
authorization from Congress before the military can be used. 
The Court explored this balance of powers in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, where Justice Jackson outlined that the level of the President’s power 
fluctuates with “disjunction or conjunction” in relation to congressional power.64 To 
illustrate this fluctuation, Jackson described the President’s power in three different 
instances, which he referred to as zones. He outlined that the executive is in the first 
zone, where its power is at its highest, when “the President acts pursuant to an express 
or implied authorization of Congress.”65 Continuing, the executive is in the third 
zone, where its power is at its lowest, “when the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”66 Finally, in the 
middle is the second zone, or the “zone of twilight,” where “the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”67 It is within this zone 
that the executive may act using its own independent powers because either power 
has either been distributed to both Congress and the President, or the distribution of 
powers is unknown.68 
In order for the President’s decision to engage in military action against ISIL to 
be considered in Youngstown’s first zone, Congress must have given authorization. 
Congress, at this time, has not formally declared war against ISIL; however, courts 
have generally held that such a formal declaration of war is not required.69 
Alternatively, in recent instances Congress has enacted statutes to expressly 
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authorize the use of military force.70 For example, Congress authorized the Gulf War, 
the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War through AUMFs rather than formal 
declarations of war.71 While these are means of express authorization, Congress can 
also implicitly authorize the executive’s actions. “The Supreme Court has recognized 
that, as a general matter, appropriation statutes may ‘stand[] as confirmation and 
ratification of the action of the Chief Executive.’”72 In this instance, it is possible that 
Congress has expressly (through the 9/11 AUMF) or implicitly (through 
appropriations) authorized the executive to use force to combat ISIL. Such 
authorization would put the executive at its apex of authority to continue the 
campaign against ISIL. 
A. Express Authorization 
On September 12, 2001, the White House proposed a resolution to Congress 
requesting authorization of the use of force against not only those “nations, 
organizations, and persons” directly linked to the events of September 11, but also 
to use any “required action to deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or 
aggression against the United States.”73 By proposing this resolution, President Bush 
seemingly requested that Congress give the executive the authority to engage in 
armed conflict with terrorist organizations everywhere in the world.74 Although 
Congress reeled in Bush’s initial resolution from any terrorist anywhere to the 
comparatively narrower scope of “those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001,” the scope of authorization Congress granted to the 
executive in the 9/11 AUMF remained broad.75  
The 9/11 AUMF is an express authorization from Congress, meaning that it places 
the President in Youngstown’s first zone where executive power is at its greatest. In 
order to determine if the 9/11 AUMF can be applied to ISIL, the scope of 
authorization must first be examined. 
1. Methods of Inclusion 
At the time the AUMF was passed, Congress had some intelligence regarding the 
extent of bin-Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban’s involvement in and responsibility 
for the September 11th attacks.76 Despite this, the AUMF names no specific parties. 
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Instead, Congress used only general nouns regarding “nations, persons, or 
organizations.”77 The broad language of this authorization allowed al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and other terror organizations to fall within the scope of the AUMF. This 
language should include ISIL within the scope of authorization for the reasons 
discussed in this Part.78 
The scope of the 9/11 AUMF should be treated as a web that is composed of a 
center with several strands sprouting outward. The nations, persons, or organizations 
directly involved in the September 11th attacks are at the center of this web. 
Naturally, under the 9/11 AUMF the “persons” and “organizations” directly 
responsible for the September 11th attacks, such as Usama bin-Laden and the “core 
al-Qaeda group,” fall within the scope of “those persons or organizations” Congress 
has authorized force against.79 It is important to note that while most AUMFs have 
targeted a specific country or countries, the 9/11 AUMF gave authorization to use 
force against “organizations or persons.”80 Prior to this particular AUMF, Congress 
had never given authorization in such a broad manner.81  
Although not every member of the core al-Qaeda group was directly involved in 
the September 11th attacks, the AUMF covers these individuals for their membership 
in the culpable organization.82 These members are a part of the organization that 
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caused the attacks and would therefore also fall within the center of the web. 
Considering that the AUMF aimed to “prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such . . . organizations,”83 the scope is 
reasonable because all members of al-Qaeda inherently pose a threat to the United 
States and its citizens.84 Using the same reasoning, al-Qaeda members who joined 
after the attacks are equally dangerous and should be covered by the 9/11 AUMF as 
well.85  
Parties that are covered by the AUMF due to their association with al-Qaeda 
(rather than their membership in the organization) fall on the “strands” of the web. 
For example, some parties are covered by the AUMF because they “harbored such 
organizations or persons.” The Taliban is a primary example of such an organization. 
The Taliban had no direct connection to the September 11th attacks; instead, this 
organization was implicated because it harbored and provided aid to Usama bin-
Laden and al-Qaeda.86 The Supreme Court confirmed that the Taliban fell within the 
scope of the 9/11 AUMF in Hamdi, when it explained that “[t]here can be no doubt 
that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the 
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network 
responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the 
AUMF.”87 From this holding, it can be concluded that any “organization that joins 
al Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11th, can be 
viewed as part of the ‘organization’ against which Congress authorized force.”88  
Further, courts have held that, “[i]n addition to members of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban,” the 9/11 AUMF applies to “members of ‘associated forces.’”89 The court 
in Hamlily held that a group constitutes an associated force if it is a co-belligerent as 
defined under the laws of war.90 Although the court in Hamlily determined that the 
international laws of war should be used to interpret what constitutes an “associated 
force,” there is no evidence that Congress intended international laws to limit the 
9/11 AUMF’s authorization.91 The Obama administration asserted that in order to be 
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an associated force, the group must be “(1) an organized, armed group that (2) 
aligned itself with al-Qaeda, and (3) entered the fight against the United States and 
its coalition partners.”92 The position that ISIL is an “associated force” under the 9/11 
AUMF has been maintained by the Trump Administration.93 
2. ISIL’s Inclusion Under the 9/11 AUMF 
Even in the absence of an ISIL-specific AUMF, President Obama asserted that he 
had “the authority to address the threat from ISIL” due to the 9/11 AUMF.94 An 
application of the AUMF’s scope to ISIL justifies both President Obama and 
President Trump’s reliance on the 9/11 AUMF to combat ISIL. 
 The most immediate cause for ISIL’s inclusion under the AUMF would be if the 
organization holds some responsibility for the September 11th attacks. This 
methodology will not work because there is no evidence that ISIL (at the time, JTWJ) 
played any role in the attacks.95 Regardless, it is still possible that ISIL falls within 
the AUMF’s initial scope. All members of the al-Qaeda organization fall within the 
9/11 AUMF’s authorization, even if they joined al-Qaeda after the September 11th 
attacks.96 This may include ISIL in the scope of the AUMF because it joined the al-
Qaeda network after the attacks.97 While this cause for inclusion would work for an 
organization that merged with al-Qaeda; it does not work for affiliate organizations 
because their members do not belong to the core al-Qaeda. Therefore, this cause for 
inclusion is likely insufficient because ISIL never merged with al-Qaeda; meaning 
that its members did not belong to the core al-Qaeda group.98 
Although ISIL was a part of the al-Qaeda network, the group was an affiliate 
organization and not a part of the core al-Qaeda group in Pakistan. While one may 
argue that every al-Qaeda affiliate organization is implicated in the same manner, 
this is an incorrect analysis of congressional intent. If every al-Qaeda affiliate fell 
within the scope of the AUMF, the authorization would reach far outside the Middle 
East to all areas of the world.99 By denying President Bush’s initial resolution, 
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Congress made it clear that it did not want to give the executive worldwide 
authorization to use force against every terror organization.100 Therefore, such an 
interpretation would be contrary to Congress’s intent when the 9/11 AUMF was 
passed. 
If the 9/11 AUMF includes al-Qaeda affiliates, presumably it would only include 
those closest to the core al-Qaeda group to avoid worldwide authorization. ISIL 
would meet this qualifying criterion because it is one of the few organizations that 
swore allegiance to al-Qaeda and was officially recognized by the al-Qaeda core.101 
This may still be a problematic interpretation because the affiliates officially 
recognized by the al-Qaeda core spread from West Africa to parts of South Asia and 
Eurasia.102 Although this may not constitute worldwide authorization, it would grant 
an authorization to use force against organizations that are unlikely to pose a future 
security threat to the United States.103 This is the type of authorization Congress 
wanted to avoid when it denied Bush’s proposed AUMF and implemented the 9/11 
AUMF.104 While authorization in this fashion is possible, relying on an associated 
force analysis would include ISIL while excluding organizations that have no history 
with the United States. Therefore, whether ISIL is an associated force must be 
determined. 
When determining whether an organization is an associated force, a functional 
rather than formalistic approach should be used.105 This is because there cannot be 
an exhaustive list of which organizations are considered an associated force.106 When 
applying ISIL to the associated force elements outlined by the Obama administration, 
the organization clearly constitutes an associated force. As previously outlined, a 
terror organization is considered an associated force if it is “(1) an organized, armed 
group that (2) aligned itself with al-Qaeda, and (3) entered the fight against the 
United States and its coalition partners.”107 
ISIL is an organized armed group and it was aligned with al-Qaeda for at least a 
decade.108 Additionally, the organization fought against the United States and its 
coalition partners in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq from 2004 to the present day, and 
in Syria from 2014 to the present day.109 Furthermore, inclusion of ISIL as an 
associated force is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdi, where the 
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Court concluded that the Taliban fell within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF because it 
fought against the United States alongside al-Qaeda.110 Therefore ISIL should be 
considered an associated force and should be included within the authorization 
created by the 9/11 AUMF. 
There are a few compelling, but ultimately misguided, arguments against the 
inclusion of ISIL within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF. The first counterargument is 
that Congress did not intend to authorize any armed conflict with ISIL because the 
organization did not exist when the September 11th attacks occurred. This argument 
is valid only if the name of an organization is the key factor when determining 
whether a person or organization is included within the scope of authorization. As 
established, the group, although under a different name at the time, was part of the 
al-Qaeda network for a decade, supported Usama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda in efforts 
made against the United States, and still threatens future terror attacks against the 
United States and its allies. If ISIL had not changed its name in 2014, it would 
presumably still be covered by the AUMF. To rule that ISIL is not included within 
the AUMF because it did not “exist” in 2001, would be the equivalent of ruling that 
an organization does not fall within the scope of the AUMF because it went through 
a rearrangement of organizational structure.111 Applying authorizations in this 
manner would seemingly create a legal loophole where an enemy of the United States 
could render the U.S. Commander in Chief powerless by simply going through a 
“rebranding” phase. Ruling groups outside the scope of the AUMF in this manner 
severely hinders the executive’s ability to “prevent any future acts” by “such 
organizations” because terror organizations tend to frequently reorganize.112 
A second counterargument is that interpreting the 9/11 AUMF in this manner 
could create future wars against unknown enemies in unspecified regions. As the 
AUMF is currently being used, the authorization cannot be consolidated upon a 
single group or even into one particular region. Originally the AUMF authorized the 
use of force in Afghanistan, but it is now being used to authorize force in various 
countries throughout the Middle East and Africa. For example, in addition to ISIL, 
the Obama Administration used the AUMF to combat al-Shabaab, a terror 
organization in Somalia.113 Al-Shabaab, although dangerous, had no involvement in 
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the September 11th attacks, has weak connections with al-Qaeda, and has not entered 
into hostilities directly with the United States or its allies.114 Arguably, if the 9/11 
AUMF can be applied to groups such as al-Shabaab, it could be continuously used 
to authorize hostilities against terror organizations so long as some remote 
connection to al-Qaeda exists. This cannot be the correct interpretation. However, 
the inclusion of groups like ISIL in the scope of the 9/11 AUMF is consistent with 
congressional intent.  
By denying President Bush’s initial resolution, Congress made it apparent that it 
did not want to allow the President to use force worldwide in an effort to prevent any 
and all future terror threats. For this reason, the AUMF could not be applied to a 
terror organization in South America that has no ties to al-Qaeda.115 It may also be 
incorrect to apply the AUMF to organizations that have never directly threatened the 
United States and maintain only loose ties to al-Qaeda. However, the AUMF is being 
used correctly when it is applied to ISIL due to its deep ties to al-Qaeda and the threat 
it poses to the United States and its allies. 
A final counterargument is that the AUMF, framed to include ISIL, potentially 
creates a war that could last forever, which could not have been the intent of 
Congress. The AUMF has already been used to authorize conflict for over a decade 
and, if left unchecked, could be used well into the future. Because the authorization 
granted by the 9/11 AUMF continues to change as new threats emerge, there may be 
no natural end to the hostilities authorized by the AUMF. Although this seems 
problematic, it is hardly the first time Congress has granted such indefinite 
authorization. During the Vietnam War Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, which was used as a blanket authorization against conflict in Southeast 
Asia—the region specified within the resolution.116 Congress later repealed this 
resolution because it did not wish to grant such broad authorization.117 When 
considering previous legislation, it is apparent that the indefinite nature of the 9/11 
AUMF does not undermine its validity, especially because Congress could ultimately 
repeal the AUMF. The 9/11 AUMF may not be an ideal piece of legislation, but it 
was written in a way that allows continuation of an indefinite war in various 
regions.118  
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Many claim that the 9/11 AUMF should no longer be in effect because the war 
against al-Qaeda is over. For an apt comparison, consider the famous Greek myth of 
Hercules and the Hydra. In this story, Hercules faces a hydra with numerous heads. 
When Hercules cuts off one of the heads, another grows in its place. It is only after 
the final head is removed that Hercules can claim he has defeated the hydra.119 To 
claim that the AUMF is no longer applicable because Usama bin-Laden is dead or 
because “al-Qaeda” has lost influence is to pretend that the hydra is somehow a 
different beast simply because some of the heads have been removed. ISIL has 
significant connections to al-Qaeda and poses the type of threat Congress wanted to 
eliminate when enacting the 9/11 AUMF. Therefore, ISIL should fall within the 
scope of explicit authorization. 
B. Implicit Authorization 
As previously stated, Congress denied President Obama’s request for new 
legislation authorizing hostilities with ISIL. While it is true that Congress failed to 
pass a new AUMF, it is important to note that Congress is not divided on whether 
force should be used against ISIL. Instead, Congress is divided in deciding how broad 
or narrow the authorization should be drawn. Senator Rand Paul, joined by several 
Senate Democrats, wanted the authorization to be limited to the use of force against 
ISIL in Iraq and Syria.120 Comparatively, some lawmakers, like Senators Lindsey 
Graham and John McCain, have expressed support for an AUMF with no limitations 
on the executive’s actions toward ISIL.121 Meanwhile, many members of Congress 
believe that the 9/11 AUMF is sufficient to cover any military action the executive 
takes in opposition to ISIL.122 
Further, a fraction of Congress opposes a new AUMF simply because they do not 
want to face the political consequences of declaring a new war.123 The political 
consequences of supporting a war were made obvious by the 2016 election, when 
many politicians faced scrutiny for approving the Iraq AUMF in 2002.124 Some 
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congressional members have called their colleagues “cowards” for their 
unwillingness to pass a new AUMF.125 Regardless of intent, there is an obvious 
disincentive to passing a new authorization, especially when the opposition to ISIL 
continues without one.126  
One might argue that Congress acquiesced to the assertion that the 9/11 AUMF is 
sufficient by failing to act upon President Obama’s proposed resolution. Failure to 
act could constitute acquiescence because only a “few of the members of Congress 
who are refusing to pass a new authorization are also claiming that the president lacks 
legal authority to take action.”127 Assuming Congress’s actions do not constitute 
acquiescence, Congress has authorized the use of force in another manner. 
Despite failing to pass a new AUMF, Congress has passed legislation that 
provides funding for engaging in combat with ISIL. In the 2016 Fiscal Year Spending 
Bill, Congress allocated 58.6 billion dollars to fund Overseas Contingency 
Operations and the Global War on Terror.128 Hal Rogers, the previous chairman of 
the House Appropriations Committee, indicated that a portion of these funds were 
for the purpose of “combat[ing] the threat presented by ISIL.”129 Similar funding was 
proposed by President Obama and requested by the Department of Defense for the 
2017 fiscal year.130 President Trump continued the request for funding in his first 
budget blueprint where he asked for an increase of over three billion dollars to be 
allocated to the campaign against ISIL.131 Congress responded to these requests in 
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the 2017 National Defense Act, where it further increased the funding appropriated 
to fight ISIL and requested details on the executive branch’s combat strategy.132 
The funds Congress has allocated for the purpose of combating ISIL may serve 
as the authorization needed under a Youngstown analysis. In Youngstown, Justice 
Jackson explained that the President’s powers are at their highest when the President 
acts with express or implied authority. In this case Congress, through the means of 
funding, has authorized, at least implicitly, the President to engage in hostilities 
against ISIL. 
It is well established that “Congress may express approval through the 
appropriations process.”133 The Supreme Court supports this proposition, as the 
Court has held in many cases that Congress authorized executive action through 
appropriations.134 Prior to the introduction of the War Powers Resolution, Congress 
“authorized U.S. involvement in armed conflict at least in part through appropriation 
laws.”135 The reasoning of this policy is logical because Congress would not fund 
something it does not support. 
Although appropriations constituted authorization in the past, the War Powers 
Resolution seemingly prohibited this practice when it was passed in 1973.136 On its 
face, the War Powers Resolution prevents authorization of hostilities through 
appropriations because it states: “Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities . . . shall not be inferred – (1) from any provision of law . . . including 
any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically 
authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .”137 
However, it is possible that the War Powers Resolution “‘does not bar later 
Congresses from authorizing military operations through appropriations,’ because 
the Constitution forbids an earlier Congress from binding a later one.”138 If this 
section of the War Powers Resolution does not bind the current Congress, 
authorization to use force could be granted through appropriations. 
One of the most commonly referenced instance of authorization through 
appropriations is the Vietnam War. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to 
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support the Vietnam War without ever actually declaring war. Although a few 
members of Congress ensured they were not voting “to approve the sending of 
combat troops into South Vietnam,” Congress continued expanding the draft and 
appropriating money for the cause.139 This funding could be—and by supporters 
was—construed as congressional authorization for the war.140 In fact, courts even 
held that the congressional appropriations for the war served as a means of 
authorization.141 
Admittedly, using the Vietnam War as an example for implicit authorization is 
somewhat problematic because it is difficult to determine the true intent of Congress. 
It is possible that Congress was implicitly authorizing the Vietnam War through 
appropriations to avoid political consequences. Alternatively, it could be that 
Congress appropriated funding for the sole purpose of supporting the troops that were 
already fighting in Vietnam.142 For example, Senator McGovern, a senator during 
the Vietnam War, said the following in regard to funding the war: “‘[I]t involves 
more [than] the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to 
question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and 
a member of our family . . . .’”143 Testimonies like this suggest that lawmakers, 
regardless of their position on the war itself, would continue appropriating funds to 
support U.S. troops. If the purpose of funding is to ensure American troops remained 
fully supplied, it is difficult to argue that such appropriations constitute any type of 
authorization.144 
However, the conflict with ISIL is significantly different from the Vietnam War, 
namely because an absence of funding would not put the lives of American troops 
directly at risk. For the most part, our military efforts against ISIL have been 
primarily composed of tactical airstrikes.145 The only ground forces allocated to the 
campaign against ISIL are the few special operations troops, whose primary purpose 
is training Syrian rebels and providing support to the Iraqi military.146 In this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. ELY, supra note 126, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]here was 
sufficient legislative action in extending the Selective Service Act and in appropriating billions 
of dollars to carry on military and naval operations in Vietnam to ratify and approve the 
measures taken by the Executive, even in the absence of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.”). 
 142. See e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“A Congressman 
wholly opposed to the war’s commencement and continuation might vote for the military 
appropriations . . . because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already 
fighting.”). 
 143. ELY, supra note 126, at 29. 
 144. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 615. 
 145. Fantz, supra note 6. 
 146. Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Plans to Step Up Military Campaign Against 
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/world/middleeast/us-
plans-to-step-upmilitary-campaign-against-isis.html [https://perma.cc/VJ7E-DTLW]; see 
Dan Lamothe, There Are Four Times As Many U.S. Troops in Syria As Previously 
Acknowledged by the Pentagon, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/06/there-are-four-times-as-
many-u-s-troops-in-syria-as-previously-acknowledged-by-the-pentagon/ 
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6dfc05dcab9b [https://perma.cc/LNK6-QPXE] (reporting “2,000 
2018] Congressional Authorization of the Campaign Against ISIL 135 
 
instance, if Congress did not appropriate funds the world effort to suppress the threat 
of ISIL would be heavily undermined, but U.S. troops would not be exposed to 
heightened danger—at least not to the extent of those fighting in Vietnam—due to 
the lack of congressional support.  
Although appropriations can constitute authorization, it should not be presumed. 
When considering whether an appropriation statute is a signal of approval or 
disapproval from Congress, “[t]he whole question depends on the intention of 
Congress as expressed in the statutes.”147 In addition to intent, Congress must act 
with knowledge of the purpose of the funding in order for an appropriation to 
constitute authorization.148 In this instance there are several indicators that Congress 
did have knowledge of—and supported—the purpose of the appropriations.  
The first indicator that Congress acted with knowledge is the testimony of the 
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.149 As previously stated, the 
chairman indicated that a portion of appropriated funds were for the purpose of 
combating ISIL.150 Such indications have continued, as spending legislation directly 
outlines that funds are allocated for the purpose of fighting ISIL.151 Furthermore, the 
reasonable use of the funds should also be considered. Funds have been appropriated 
specifically to engage in hostilities in both Iraq and Syria.152 It would be unreasonable 
to conclude that none of the appropriated funds are to be used to engage in hostilities 
against ISIL—the main force opposing the United States in the region.153  
A final, but perhaps less clear, indicator is the opinions of the constituents 
lawmakers have been elected to serve. U.S. citizens have overwhelmingly expressed 
that the threat of ISIL is one of their top concerns.154 Due to the fear of ISIL, seventy-
one percent of Americans believe that the ability of a terrorist organization to launch 
an attack on the United States is at least as high as it was on September 11th.155 
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Regardless of security concerns, a majority of Americans, regardless of political 
affiliation, support the campaign against ISIL, and at least half of Americans believe 
that the United States should be more involved in subduing ISIL.156 It is a reasonable 
conclusion that lawmakers have acted on behalf of their constituents by funding the 
campaign against ISIL, thus giving the President authorization through 
appropriations. 
In the Constitution, there is no required manner by which Congress must “declare 
war,” meaning that appropriations can serve as authorization.157 If Congress has 
knowledge and its intent is obvious, appropriations can be considered evidence of 
approval.158 Three factors indicate these requirements have been met: (1) the direct 
testimony of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, (2) the appropriation of 
funds for use of force in a region where ISIL is the major enemy combatant, and (3) 
the desires of American citizens. Under these conditions it is apparent that Congress 
used appropriations to authorize the use of force against ISIL. 
III. ISIL AND THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY 
Although it has been difficult to predict almost anything about how the Trump 
administration addresses U.S. foreign policy, it is safe to assume that subduing ISIL 
will remain on the agenda. During his campaign, President Trump frequently made 
promises that, if elected, he would eliminate the threat of ISIL.159 Although there has 
not been an increase in the use of military force against ISIL, the campaign against 
ISIL has continued steadily through both the presidential transition and Trump’s first 
year as President.160 Trump has also recognized that despite the decline of ISIL’s 
influence in Iraq and Syria, the group remains a threat because of its presence 
elsewhere.161 Based on Trump’s rhetoric and his continuous request for funding to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. U.S. Military Action Against ISIS, Policy Toward Terrorism, PEW RES. CTR. tbl. 1 
(May 4, 2016), http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/4-u-s-military-action-against-isis-
policy-toward-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/R64T-99RF] (reporting that 66% of Republicans, 
65% of Democrats, and 57% of Independents support the campaign against ISIL). Despite the 
support for continuing the campaign against ISIL, Americans remain divided on whether 
ground troops should be committed to combat ISIL. Id. at tbl. 4 (reporting that 46% of 
Americans support using ground troops while 50% oppose their use). 
 157. United States v. Castillo, 34 M.J. 1160, 1164 (N.M.C.M.R. 1992) (“Congress may 
assent to the waging of war by means other than a formal declaration of war, and what form it 
chooses to record that assent is within its discretion to decide.”). 
 158. ELY, supra note 126, at 27. 
 159. Foreign Policy and Defeating ISIS, TRUMP-PENCE, 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/foreign-policy-and-defeating-isis (archived at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161112015440/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/foreig
n-policy-and-defeating-isis/ [https://perma.cc/V3LG-JRTN]). 
 160. Julian Borger, Trump’s Claim US Hitting ‘Much Harder’ After NY Attack Not 
Supported by Data, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/nov/03/trump-isis-us-new-york-military-data [https://perma.cc/LM9K-382V].  
 161. Trump, supra note 27. Although it seems the Trump administration is relying on the 
associated forces theory for justification, it has been somewhat vague when explaining why 
the 9/11 AUMF is sufficient authorization. Rita Siemion, Trump Administration Says Its 
Broad Powers Under the 2001 AUMF Are Plenty, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 2, 2017), 
2018] Congressional Authorization of the Campaign Against ISIL 137 
 
combat ISIL,162 it seems that he, unsurprisingly, will continue the use of military 
force against the organization into the indefinite future. 
Despite the stark contrast between President Trump and former President 
Obama’s political ideologies, Trump has followed in Obama’s footsteps by relying 
on the 9/11 AUMF as justification for using force against ISIL. Seemingly, the 
administration is using the same “associated forces” legal theory as its 
predecessor.163 Considering that Congress is controlled by Republicans, Trump 
could have simply requested a new AUMF to authorize hostilities against ISIL.164 If 
such a request were made, there exists the possibility that Congress would refuse to 
pass legislation due to the still-existing disagreement on how much power should be 
granted to the executive.165 Trump’s cabinet has suggested it would support a new 
form of authorization being passed, but ultimately contends that the 9/11 AUMF is 
sufficient authorization.166  
One concern the Trump administration should have is the possibility of the 9/11 
AUMF being repealed. In June 2017 an amendment to the 2018 Defense 
Appropriations Bill was passed by the House of Representatives’ Appropriations 
Committee that, if enacted, would have repealed the AUMF.167 The amendment was 
introduced by Representative Barbara Lee, who argued that the 9/11 AUMF acts as 
a “blank check” to give the executive unlimited authority.168 Although the 
amendment ultimately died in the senate, many lawmakers agreed that it was time to 
have a vote on a new authorization.169 It is possible that in the future the 9/11 AUMF 
will successfully be repealed, which would effectively end any explicit or implicit 
authorization.170 
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CONCLUSION 
The Constitution generally requires that the President receive authorization from 
Congress before conducting hostilities against an opposing force. Because Congress 
has not passed an ISIL specific AUMF or declared war on ISIL, the authorization 
must come from a different source. The campaign against ISIL is not unconstitutional 
because Congress has authorized action in two different ways. First, the executive 
has explicit authorization because ISIL is an associated force of al-Qaeda and 
therefore falls under the 9/11 AUMF that was passed by Congress in 2001. Second, 
the executive has implicit authorization because Congress continuously provides 
funding to the executive for the purpose of conducting hostilities against ISIL, which 
constitutes an authorization though means of appropriation. 
The future of U.S. foreign policy has been somewhat unpredictable since the 
election of Donald Trump as President. Due to the uncertainty of how Trump will 
proceed during his presidency, it is hard to estimate how he will continue to combat 
ISIL, which legal theory he will use to justify his actions, or who the U.S.’s key allies 
will be in the campaign. Perhaps the only certain future aspect of U.S. foreign policy 
is that the elimination of ISIL’s influence will remain a critical goal of both the 
United States and its allies. 
The constitutionality of the campaign against ISIL is a question that has become 
increasingly important as most of the U.S. Government refuses to make any type of 
meaningful decision. In addition to congressional gridlock, the judicial branch has 
also refrained from providing guidance on the legality of the hostilities.171 A 
standstill of these two branches seemingly creates an ultimatum of fighting an 
unconstitutional war or halting the campaign against ISIL. The second option would 
be detrimental to the United States and its allies because it would effectively halt the 
efforts against ISIL, leaving the organization to continue expanding and conducting 
devastating attacks. Fortunately, Congress has authorized, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, U.S. military action against ISIL. 
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